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Abstract—The trend toward increasing energy efficiency and
variable renewable energy (VRE) production has implications for
combined heat and power (CHP) plants, which operate in both
the price-driven power market and the district heating (DH)
sector. Since CHP will be important in VRE integration, we
develop a complementarity model to analyze CHP producers’
roles in integrated markets. We use a Nordic case study to gain
insights into (i) the effect of the link between CHP and DH on
market power and (ii) market power’s impact on operations in
the DH sector. The results indicate that (i) the link of CHP to
DH supply can increase market power and (ii) market power
can induce shifts in DH production from heat-only to CHP.
NOMENCLATURE
Indices and Sets
e ∈ E := {wind, solar}: Variable renewable energy (VRE)
sources
i ∈ I: Producers
ℓ ∈ L: Power lines
ℓAC ∈ LAC ⊂ L: AC power lines
ℓDC ∈ LDC ⊂ L: DC power lines
n ∈ N : Nodes
nAC ∈ NAC ⊂ N : Nodes connected to AC lines
nDC ∈ NDC ⊂ N : Nodes connected only to DC lines
t ∈ T : Time periods
u ∈ U : Power-only unit types
x ∈ X : Heat-only unit types
y ∈ Y: Combined heat and power (CHP) unit types
yB ∈ YB ⊂ Y: Back-pressure CHP unit types
yE ∈ YE ⊂ Y: Extraction CHP unit types
u ∈ Un,i: Power-only units of producer i ∈ I at node n ∈ N
x ∈ Xn,i: Heat-only units of producer i ∈ I at node n ∈ N
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y ∈ Yn,i: CHP units of producer i ∈ I at node n ∈ N
LAC ∪ LDC = L, LAC ∩ LDC = ∅, NAC ∪ NDC = N .
Parameters
Aen,t: Availability factor of VRE e ∈ E at node n ∈ N during
period t ∈ T (-)
C
power
n,u,t : Generation cost of power-only unit u ∈ Un,i of
producer i ∈ I at node n ∈ N in period t ∈ T (e/MWh)
Cheatx : Generation cost of heat-only unit x ∈ Xn,i (e/MWhth)
C
chp,p
y : Electricity generation cost of CHP unit y ∈ Yn,i
(e/MWh)
C
chp,h
y : Heat generation cost of CHP unit y ∈ Yn,i (e/MWhth)
Dintn,t: Intercept of linear inverse demand function at node
n ∈ N during period t ∈ T (e/MWh)
D
slp
n,t: Slope of linear inverse demand function at node n ∈ N
during period t ∈ T (e/MWh2)
Eeff: Heat storage input efficiency (-)
Edec: Rate of decay in heat storage per hour (-)
Ein/Eout: Heat storage charge/discharge rate (MWth/MWhth)
E
max
n,i /Eminn,i : Heat storage maximum/minimum capacity of pro-
ducer i ∈ I at node n ∈ N (MWhth)
Etransn : Heat transmission efficiency within node n ∈ N (-)
F yE : Maximum fuel intake of extraction CHP unit yE ∈ YE
(MWh)
G
power
n,i,u: Capacity of power-only unit u ∈ Un,i of producer
i ∈ I at node n ∈ N (MW)
G
heat
n,i,x: Capacity of heat-only unit x ∈ Xn,i of producer i ∈ I
at node n ∈ N (MWth)
G
chp,h
n,i,y: Maximum heat capacity of CHP unit y ∈ Yn,i of
producer i ∈ I at node n ∈ N (MWth)
G
e
n,i: Capacity of VRE type e ∈ E of producer i ∈ I at node
n ∈ N (MW)
HℓAC,n: Element (ℓAC, n) of network transfer matrix; the sus-
ceptance on line ℓAC ∈ LAC ⊂ L to node n ∈ N in the AC
part of the network (1/Ω)
Kℓ/Kℓ: Capacity of power line ℓ ∈ L in +/- direction (MW)
Mℓ,n: Incidence matrix of the grid topology; the start (-1) and
end (+1) nodes n ∈ N of line ℓ ∈ L (-)
P heatn : Heat price at node n ∈ N (e/MWhth)
Qheatn,i,t: Heat sales by producer i ∈ I at node n ∈ N during
period t (MWhth)
R
p-t-h
yB
/Rp-t-h
yE
: Power-to-heat ratio of back-pressure CHP type
yB ∈ YB or extraction CHP type yE ∈ YE (MWh/MWhth)
Rf-t-h
yE
: Fuel-to-heat ratio of CHP type yE ∈ YE (MWh/MWhth)
R
f-t-p
yE
: Fuel-to-power ratio of CHP type yE ∈ YE (-)
R
heat-only
n,i : Minimum share of district heating (DH) to be met
2by heat-only generation for (fringe) producer i ∈ I at node
n ∈ N (-)
R
power-up
u /Rpower-downu : Ramp limits for power-only unit u ∈ U
(-)
R
heat-up
x /Rheat-downx : Ramp limits for heat-only unit x ∈ X (-)
R
chp-up
y /Rchp-downy : Ramp limits for CHP unit y ∈ Y (-)
SnAC ∈ {0, 1}: Definition of the slack node, nAC ∈ NAC (-)
Tt: Length of period t ∈ T (h)
Primal Variables
fℓ,t: Power flow on line ℓ ∈ L during period t ∈ T (MW)
g
power
n,i,u,t: Electricity-only generation at node n ∈ N by producer
i ∈ I using u ∈ Un,i during period t ∈ T (MWh)
gheatn,i,x,t: Heat-only generation at node n ∈ N by producer
i ∈ I using x ∈ Xn,i during period t ∈ T (MWhth)
g
chp,p
n,i,y,t: CHP electricity generation at node n ∈ N by producer
i ∈ I using y ∈ Yn,i during period t ∈ T (MWh)
g
chp,h
n,i,y,t: CHP heat generation at node n ∈ N by producer
i ∈ I using y ∈ Yn,i during period t ∈ T (MWhth)
gen,i,t: VRE electricity generation at node n ∈ N by producer
i ∈ I using e ∈ E during period t ∈ T (MWh)
q
power
n,i,t : Electricity sales at node n ∈ N by producer i ∈ I
during period t ∈ T (MWh)
rston,i,t: Stored heat at node n ∈ N by producer i ∈ I during
period t ∈ T (MWhth)
rinn,i,t/routn,i,t: Charged/discharged heat at node n ∈ N by
producer i ∈ I during period t ∈ T (MWhth)
θnAC,t: Voltage angle at node nAC ∈ NAC during period t ∈ T
(rad)
Dual Variables
βbaln,i,t: Shadow price of heat storage balance constraint at node
n ∈ N by producer i ∈ I during period t ∈ T (e/MWhth)
βinn,i,t/βoutn,i,t: Shadow price of heat storage charge/discharge
constraint at node n ∈ N by producer i ∈ I during period
t ∈ T (e/MWhth)
βlbn,i,t/βubn,i,t: Shadow price of heat storage minimum/maximum
capacity constraint at node n ∈ N by producer i ∈ I during
period t ∈ T (e/MWhth)
γnAC,t: Shadow price of slack node nAC ∈ NAC during period
t ∈ T (-)
ηℓAC,t: Shadow price of loop-flow constraint on AC lines
ℓAC ∈ LAC during period t ∈ T (e/MWh)
δ
power
i,t : Shadow price of electricity balance of producer i ∈ I
during period t ∈ T (e/MWh)
δheatn,i,t: Shadow price of heat balance of producer i ∈ I at
node n ∈ N during period t ∈ T (e/MWhth)
δ
heat-only
n,i,t : Shadow price of minimum heat-only/DH ratio,
producer i ∈ I at node n ∈ N during period t ∈ T
(e/MWhth)
λ
power
n,i,u,t: Shadow price of power-only capacity at node n ∈ N
of producer i ∈ I for type u ∈ Un,i during period t ∈ T
(e/MWh)
λ
chp,h
n,i,y,t: Shadow price of CHP heat capacity at node n ∈ N
of producer i ∈ I for type y ∈ Yn,i during period t ∈ T
(e/MWhth)
λheatn,i,x,t: Shadow price of heat-only capacity at node n ∈ N
of producer i ∈ I for type x ∈ Xn,i during period t ∈ T
(e/MWhth)
λen,i,t: Shadow price of VRE capacity at node n ∈ N of
producer i ∈ I for type e ∈ E during period t ∈ T (e/MWh)
µℓ,t/µℓ,t: Shadow price of transmission capacity on line ℓ ∈ L
in +/- direction during period t ∈ T (e/MWh)
ρ
power-up
n,i,u,t /ρ
power-down
n,i,u,t : Shadow price of ramping up/down power
generation u ∈ Un,i at node n ∈ N of producer i ∈ I during
period t ∈ T (e/MWh)
ρ
heat-up
n,i,x,t/ρheat-downn,i,x,t : Shadow price of ramping up/down heat-only
generation x ∈ Xn,i at node n ∈ N of producer i ∈ I during
period t ∈ T (e/MWhth)
ρ
chp-up
n,i,y,t/ρ
chp-down
n,i,y,t : Shadow price of ramping up/down CHP
generation y ∈ Yn,i at node n ∈ N of producer i ∈ I during
period t ∈ T (e/MWhth)
φB
n,i,yB,t: Shadow price of power-to-heat constraint of back-
pressure CHP unit yB ∈ YBn,i at node n ∈ N of producer
i ∈ I during period t ∈ T (e/MWh)
φ
E,p-t-h
n,i,yE,t
: Shadow price of power-to-heat constraint of
extraction CHP unit yE ∈ YEn,i at node n ∈ N of producer
i ∈ I during period t ∈ T (e/MWh)
φE,ub-fuel
n,i,yE,t
: Shadow price of maximum fuel intake constraint of
extraction CHP unit yE ∈ YEn,i at node n ∈ N of producer
i ∈ I during period t ∈ T (e/MWh)
ωn,t: Shadow price of power market-clearing condition at
node n ∈ N during period t ∈ T (e/MWh)
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
Energy markets in the European Union (EU) are undergoing
a paradigm shift. First, climate policy incentivizes power
companies to adopt variable renewable energy (VRE), e.g.,
solar photovoltaic (PV) and wind power [1]. Since these non-
dispatchable and decentralized energy sources can increase
balancing needs, power markets are becoming more inter-
connected [2]. Second, energy efficiency is critical in clean-
energy endeavors [3], whereby tightening requirements call
for technological innovations. This may mean investments in
combined heat and power (CHP) plants together with district
heating (DH) network extensions. The importance of the DH
sector is highlighted by the fact that heating comprises about
50% of the global final energy demand [4].
Given this background, CHP has been proposed in the EU as
a linchpin for reducing greenhouse gas emissions [5]. Because
CHP uses excess heat from power production, its resource
efficiency is circa (ca.) 90%, in contrast to ca. 40% with
power-only generation. Finland and Denmark are leaders in
CHP use with about 75% of DH and ca. 35% and 50% of
annual power production covered by CHP, respectively [6].
Moreover, 75% of the DH capacity in these two countries
is based on CHP. Even in a hydro- and nuclear-rich country
like Sweden, CHP comprises over 10% of the installed power
capacity. Additionally, from the perspective of concentration
of ownership, only 20 CHP plants in Denmark and 47 in
Finland account for 70% and 68%, respectively, of the total
installed CHP power capacity. In other words, large power
companies have the market share to exert market power, i.e.,
3withhold output in order to raise prices. Thus, combined with
the ambitious energy-efficiency, carbon-reduction, and VRE
targets of the EU, CHP is likely to play a large role in future
energy systems [7], and it would be prudent for policymakers
to assess how CHP facilitates producers’ use of market power
and its implications for the DH sector.
B. Literature Review
In the Nordic countries, CHP operations face asymmetric
regulations: the power price is determined by day-ahead and
intraday markets in Nord Pool, while heat is supplied to
consumers at contract-based long-term prices. Due to the
DH sector’s naturally dominant market position, the pricing
decisions are limited by antitrust legislation and authority
supervision [8]. The coordinated planning problem and the
resulting feasible operating region (FOR) for CHP has been
discussed as a multi-commodity robust optimization problem
using unit commitment [9]. Another approach is taken to use
a hierarchical stochastic setup to model CHP operations under
uncertainty [10] resulting in a bi-level formulation that allows
heat dispatch at the upper level, while modeling the day-
ahead power market at the lower level. [11] and [12] focus on
developing algorithms for solving hourly CHP operations with
convex three-dimensional FORs efficiently, and Wu and Rosen
[13] implement an equilibrium model to show the benefits of
CHP on social welfare under perfect competition.
Chen et al. [14] examine how CHP with electric boilers
and heat storage can provide system flexibility with VRE
integration by developing a linear model with a convex CHP
FOR (Fig. 1). On a related note, Hellmers et al. [15] show
that the coordination between CHP and wind in a portfolio
maximizes the expected profit for a producer in a two-price
structure of the balancing market, and [16] studies the role
of heat pumps and regulating CHP to integrate excess wind
into the system in liberalized power markets. Overall, the DH
sector can improve the performance of energy systems under
a high VRE share [17], [18].
In spite of ongoing VRE adoption, most energy systems are
based on large companies’ conventional production decisions.
Under perfect competition, the market price of a commodity is
set by the marginal cost of production. In reality, a few power
companies typically own sufficient generation capacity to exert
market power, i.e., raise equilibrium prices, by withholding
production. Under the Cournot assumption, each producer
behaves as if other producers will not alter their generation
[19]. Furthermore, a solution in which (i) each producer
satisfies its first-order conditions for profit maximization while
(ii) simultaneously meeting its constraints and ensuring the
industry supply equals demand is a market equilibrium, which
is referred to as a Nash equilibrium when no producer has
the incentive to deviate unilaterally from this solution. The
Cournot assumption together with the Nash equilibrium leads
to the Nash-Cournot game-theoretic framework [20]. Besides
the potential for production withholding in the power sector
alone, the link between heat and power in the Nordic region
provides additional flexibility to power companies to exert
market power.
Given the increasing penetration of VRE, CHP capacity is
likely to play a prominent role, which necessitates a careful
analysis of its implications for market power. Indeed, evidence
of post-deregulation market power has emerged, e.g., from the
U.K. [21]. While there is no evidence of systematically higher-
than-marginal-cost prices in Nord Pool, there can be regional
market power due to insufficient transmission capacity, high
national market concentration, and vertical integration. Thus,
Nordic market power needs to be studied also from the
perspective of base-load capacity withholding, e.g., plants’
maintenance timing and hydropower reservoir use [22].
C. Research Objectives and Contribution
While complementarity models have been applied to study
deregulated power industries [20], the asymmetric link of CHP
to both power and DH supply has rarely been addressed. Espe-
cially in DH-intensive countries, models without the DH sector
overlook an important part of energy systems. In particular,
the complementarity approach enables us to examine system-
wide impacts of CHP with the possibility of strategic market
power use. Furthermore, network effects have become more
significant because of VRE integration: the CHP equilibrium
models by [13] and [10] ignore network effects, and Wu and
Rosen [13] do not consider either VRE or market power.
We develop a complementarity model to study the role
of CHP in the Nordic day-ahead market with ramping and
transmission constraints. Indeed, complementarity modeling is
flexible enough to assess market designs with increasing VRE
shares, energy storage, and the gas market, e.g., [23]–[27].
This provides a framework that is appropriate for the research
question (CHP’s impact on market power) and the case study
(Nordic region) because:
• Markets are cleared in the Nordic region as in the rest
of Western Europe without unit commitment [25], [28].
Thus, in order to provide credible insights, our model
needs to reflect market operations.
• Including market power in unit-commitment models in-
volves the addition of side constraints that mimic strategic
behavior, e.g., enforcing that marginal revenue is greater
than or equal to marginal cost only if the unit is commit-
ted [29]. As [19] explains, such a constraint could become
unwieldy for multi-period models as the marginal revenue
may drop below the marginal cost for committed units
during off-peak periods depending on the fixed costs.
Given its high overall energy efficiency, CHP is likely to be a
part of DH-intensive countries’ low-carbon futures. Neverthe-
less, coupled heat and power markets along with producers’
ability to exert market power may hinder VRE integration if
CHP’s role is not fully understood. Consequently, we provide
insights on market power’s effects in such a system.
We use Nordic data to implement a case study of how (i)
market power is impacted by CHP and (ii) market power
can affect DH supply. We find that (i) not only can CHP
intensify market power, but also (ii) market power can shift DH
production between heat-only and CHP capacity. Thus, our
model explicates CHP operations within the changing energy
system and offers policy insights into the roles of different
energy production types. The rest of this paper is structured
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Fig. 1. A simplified feasible operating region for a coal extraction CHP unit.
as follows: Section II develops the mathematical formulation,
Section III provides numerical examples for the Nordic energy
system, and Section IV concludes.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
A. Decision-Making Problems
1) Producers i ∈ I: Producers may own and operate
conventional power capacity u ∈ Un,i, CHP capacity y ∈ Yn,i,
heat-only capacity x ∈ Xn,i, and VRE capacity e ∈ E at any
node n ∈ N of the network. There are two types of CHP
plants: back-pressure (yB ∈ YB ⊂ Y) and extraction units
(yE ∈ YE ⊂ Y). Back-pressure CHP plants have a linear
dependency between heat and power production, determined
by a power-to-heat ratio, Rp-t-h
yB
. Extraction plants are modeled
via a simplified FOR as in [10] (see Fig. 1).1
Power from either u ∈ Un,i or y ∈ Yn,i can be sold at
the production node or transmitted at a cost ωn,t and sold
elsewhere (a` la [19]); heat is consumed at the production
node. The transmission loss associated with heat, Etransn , is the
difference between production and supply at node n. The heat
price, P heatn , and hourly sales of producers, Qheatn,i,t, are fixed
and known by market participants because they are based on
bilateral contracts. To account for DH centralization, Rheat-onlyn,i
sets a minimum share of supply to be covered by heat-only.
Producers can also own heat storage capacity, Emaxn,i , which
can be charged with heat-only or CHP. There are no operating
costs for storing heat, but efficiency losses in charging and
from hourly decay are taken into account along with charging
and discharging rates.
Although VRE production is a decision variable, gen,i,t, it is
de facto exogenous and determined by the availability factors,
Aen,t, for each resource type. VRE also has zero marginal costs
and priority grid access. Hydropower variations are captured
1Such an FOR is simplified compared to that in [14] because it neglects
minimum power output constraints for active CHP units (likewise for power-
only plants). However, since we model aggregated plant types at each node by
firm, minimum power output constraints are less critical for accurate system
representation than they would have been if we were modeling a single or a
few distinct CHP units. Furthermore, including such constraints would require
binary variables to model. Unfortunately, this would not enable the application
of the complementarity framework and make it challenging to conduct an
analysis of market power. Thus, we use a simplified FOR [10] and verify ex
post that both CHP and power-only plants that are operational predominantly
run at above their minimum power output levels (see Section III-C).
by the maximum available capacity, Gpowern,i,u, which depends
on the season. Marginal costs of power production, Cpowern,u,t , are
hour-dependent for hydro (water value and load following) but
constant for other technologies.
The objective function of producer i ∈ I is to maximize
profits (1) from the sales and production of power and heat,
inclusive of congestion fees, ωn,t, for power transmission:
min
Γ
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N
[
−
(
Dintn,t −D
slp
n,t
∑
i′∈I
q
power
n,i′,t − ωn,t
)
q
power
n,i,t
− P heatn Q
heat
n,i,t +
∑
u∈Un,i
(
C
power
n,u,t − ωn,t
)
g
power
n,i,u,t
+
∑
x∈Xn,i
Cheatx g
heat
n,i,x,t +
∑
y∈Yn,i
(
Cchp,py − ωn,t
)
g
chp,p
n,i,y,t
+
∑
y∈Yn,i
Cchp,hy g
chp,h
n,i,y,t − ωn,t
∑
e∈E
gen,i,t
]
(1)
s.t.
∑
n∈N
q
power
n,i,t −
∑
n∈N
∑
u∈Un,i
g
power
n,i,u,t −
∑
n∈N
∑
y∈Yn,i
g
chp,p
n,i,y,t
−
∑
n∈N
∑
e∈E
gen,i,t = 0 (δ
power
i,t ), ∀t (2)
Qheatn,i,t −
∑
x∈Xn,i
Etransn g
heat
n,i,x,t −
∑
y∈Yn,i
Etransn g
chp,h
n,i,y,t
+ rinn,i,t − r
out
n,i,t=0 (δ
heat
n,i,t), ∀n, t (3)
g
chp,p
n,i,yB,t
−Rp-t-h
yB
g
chp,h
n,i,yB,t
= 0
(φBn,i,yB,t), ∀n, y
B ∈ YBn,i, t (4)
R
p-t-h
yE
g
chp,h
n,i,yE,t
− gchp,p
n,i,yE,t
≤ 0
(φE,p-t-h
n,i,yE,t
), ∀n, yE ∈ YEn,i, t (5)
Rf-t-hyE g
chp,h
n,i,yE,t
+Rf-t-p
yE
g
chp,p
n,i,yE,t
− F yE ≤ 0
(φE,ub-fuel
n,i,yE,t
), ∀n, yE ∈ YEn,i, t (6)
R
heat-only
n,i Q
heat
n,i,t −
∑
x∈Xn,i
Etransn g
heat
n,i,x,t ≤ 0
(δheat-onlyn,i,t ), ∀n, t (7)
g
power
n,i,u,t − TtG
power
n,i,u ≤ 0 (λ
power
n,i,u,t), ∀n, u ∈ Un,i, t (8)
g
chp,h
n,i,y,t − TtG
chp,h
n,i,y ≤ 0 (λ
chp,h
n,i,y,t), ∀n, y ∈ Yn,i, t (9)
gheatn,i,x,t − TtG
heat
n,i,x ≤ 0 (λ
heat
n,i,x,t), ∀n, x ∈ Xn,i, t (10)
gen,i,t − TtA
e
n,tG
e
n,i = 0 (λ
e
n,i,t), ∀n, e, t (11)
g
power
n,i,u,t − g
power
n,i,u,t−1 − TtR
power-up
u G
power
n,i,u ≤ 0
(ρpower-upn,i,u,t ), ∀n, u ∈ Un,i, t (12)
g
power
n,i,u,t−1 − g
power
n,i,u,t − TtR
power-down
u G
power
n,i,u ≤ 0
(ρpower-downn,i,u,t ), ∀n, u ∈ Un,i, t (13)
g
chp,h
n,i,y,t − g
chp,h
n,i,y,t−1 − TtR
chp-up
y G
chp,h
n,i,y ≤ 0
(ρchp-upn,i,y,t), ∀n, y ∈ Yn,i, t (14)
g
chp,h
n,i,y,t−1 − g
chp,h
n,i,y,t − TtR
chp-down
y G
chp,h
n,i,y ≤ 0
(ρchp-downn,i,y,t ), ∀n, y ∈ Yn,i, t (15)
5gheatn,i,x,t − g
heat
n,i,x,t−1 − TtR
heat-up
x G
heat
n,i,x ≤ 0
(ρheat-upn,i,x,t), ∀n, x ∈ Xn,i, t (16)
gheatn,i,x,t−1 − g
heat
n,i,x,t − TtR
heat-down
x G
heat
n,i,x ≤ 0
(ρheat-downn,i,x,t ), ∀n, x ∈ Xn,i, t (17)
rston,i,t − (1− E
dec)Ttrston,i,t−1 − E
effrinn,i,t + r
out
n,i,t = 0
(βbaln,i,t), ∀n, t (18)
rinn,i,t − TtE
inE
max
n,i ≤ 0 (β
in
n,i,t), ∀n, t (19)
routn,i,t − TtE
outE
max
n,i ≤ 0 (β
out
n,i,t), ∀n, t (20)
Eminn,i ≤ r
sto
n,i,t ≤ E
max
n,i (β
lb
n,i,t, β
ub
n,i,t), ∀n, t (21)
g
power
n,i,u,t ≥ 0 ∀n, u ∈ Un,i, t; g
chp,p
n,i,y,t, g
chp,h
n,i,y,t ≥ 0 ∀n,
y ∈ Yn,i, t; g
heat
n,i,x,t ≥ 0 ∀n, x ∈ Xn,i, t; g
e
n,i,t, q
power
n,i,t ,
rston,i,t, r
in
n,i,t, r
out
n,i,t ≥ 0 ∀n, t (22)
where Γ := {gpowern,i,u,t, g
chp,p
n,i,y,t, g
chp,h
n,i,y,t, g
heat
n,i,x,t, g
e
n,i,t, q
power
n,i,t , r
sto
n,i,t,
rinn,i,t, r
out
n,i,t : i ∈ I, n ∈ N , u ∈ Un,i, y ∈ Yn,i, x ∈ Xn,i, e ∈
E , t ∈ T }. Dual variables are in brackets next to their
corresponding constraints. Note that in (1), the CHP variable
cost could be implemented as being quadratic in both power
and heat output as in [14]. However, the purpose of such a
function in [14] is to capture the increasing marginal cost of
curtailing wind in a small network with two CHP plants, two
conventional plants, and a wind farm. By contrast, we model
the entire Nordic region with fourteen nodes and several GWs
of installed capacity. Thus, even though the marginal cost of
each type of CHP unit is constant, the diversity of CHP unit
types and capacities (see Table II) leads to an upward-sloping
supply stack, i.e., effectively an increasing marginal cost on
aggregate. Constraints (2)-(3) ensure the balance between
electricity/heat production and sales, respectively. Constraints
(4)-(6) represent CHP operations: (4) sets the power-to-heat
production ratio for back-pressure plants; (5)-(6) define
the FOR for extraction plants. Constraint (7) guarantees
a minimum share of nodal DH demand to be covered by
heat-only. Constraints (8)-(11) limit production levels by the
maximum capacities, and (12)-(17) set ramping limits for up
and down ramping per total installed capacity. Constraints
(18)-(21) limit heat storage operations: energy balance
between time steps (18), charge rate (19), discharge rate (20),
and maximum capacity (21).
2) Grid Owner: The grid owner controls power transmis-
sion to maximize profit (23) from congestion fees, ωn,t. As in
[19], the nodal-balance constraint (29) is not part of the grid-
owner’s optimization. Instead, it is a market-clearing condition
with its shadow prices used as congestion charges to guide the
producers’ and grid-owner’s decisions. [19] shows that such
a structure with arbitrage is equivalent to the model with a
welfare-maximizing ISO that does have the nodal-balance con-
straint under its optimization [30]. Moreover, the link between
the grid owner and the producers arises precisely because of
the market-clearing condition (29): each decision maker takes
the congestion rent, i.e., the dual variable associated with (29),
as given when making its generation or flow decision. Our
approach considers both AC and DC lines, i.e., DC load-flow
linearization with DC links, as in [31]. Decision variables are
flow, fℓ,t, for the whole grid, and voltage angle, θnAC,t, for the
AC part. NAC ⊂ N refers to nodes connected to an AC line,
whereas nodes in NDC ⊂ N have only DC connections.
min
θ
nAC,t,fℓ,t
−
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N
ωn,t
∑
ℓ∈L
Mℓ,nTtfℓ,t (23)
s.t.
∑
nAC∈NAC
TtHℓAC,nACθnAC,t − TtfℓAC,t = 0
(ηℓAC,t), ∀ℓ
AC ∈ LAC, t (24)
Ttfℓ,t − TtKℓ ≤ 0 (µℓ,t), ∀ℓ, t (25)
− Ttfℓ,t − TtKℓ ≤ 0 (µℓ,t), ∀ℓ, t (26)
TtSnAC θnAC,t = 0 (γnAC,t), ∀n
AC ∈ NAC, t (27)
θnAC,t and fℓ,t u.r.s., ∀nAC ∈ NAC, ℓ, t (28)
where u.r.s. denotes unrestricted in sign. Constraint (24) is the
loop-flow constraint for the AC lines using a DC load-flow
linearization based on Kirchhoff’s current law in a circuit.
Constraints (25) and (26) ensure that the maximum capacities
of transmission lines ℓ ∈ L are not exceeded. Constraint (27)
sets the slack node for the DC load-flow in the AC circuit.
3) Market-Clearing Condition: To ensure that nodal pro-
duction and exports/imports meet the demand, we use:∑
i∈I
q
power
n,i,t −
∑
i∈I
∑
u∈Un,i
g
power
n,i,u,t −
∑
i∈I
∑
y∈Yn,i
g
chp,p
n,i,y,t
−
∑
i∈I
∑
e∈E
gen,i,t −
∑
ℓ∈L
TtMℓ,nfℓ,t = 0 (ωn,t, u.r.s.), ∀n, t.
(29)
4) Equilibrium Problem: Because (1)-(22) and (23)-(28)
are convex optimization problems, they can be replaced by
their Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions. Thus, the equi-
librium problem comprising (1)-(22), (23)-(28), and (29) may
be rendered as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP)
comprising (F1)-(F30), (G1)-(G6), and (29) (in Appendix).
Under a Cournot oligopoly, the producers assume that total
demand,
∑
i′∈I q
power
n,i′,t, in their objective function (1) is not a
constant, as under perfect competition, but affected by their
decisions as reflected in KKT condition (F6).
III. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
We use 2014 data to study four seasonal scenarios, (M)
March, (J) June, (S) September, and (D) December, as repre-
sentative 24 hours (monthly averages for reference demand,
prices, and production) in two-hour time blocks.
A. Data
We implement numerical examples for the Nordic energy
system (Fig. 2) comprising Nord Pool and national DH
supply. Nord Pool prices are affected by regional deviations
due to transmission congestion along with temperatures and
hydrological conditions, which result in seasonal trends (Fig.
3 [32]). The price elasticity of demand is assumed to be -0.25
[33]. For modeling purposes, nodes n9-n14 are auxiliary; the
rest correspond to countries, except for Denmark, which has
two price areas. Furthermore, Baltic nodes have an aggregated
producer and no DH consideration. The dashed lines in Fig.
6Fig. 2. Test network of the Nordic power system.
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Fig. 3. Average Nord Pool system prices (e/MWh) in 2014.
TABLE I
LINE TYPES AND MAXIMUM THERMAL CAPACITIES (MW).
Line Type Positive direction Negative direction
ℓ1 AC 650 450
ℓ2 AC 150 250
ℓ3 AC 600 1000
ℓ4 AC 2145 2095
ℓ5 DC 950 1000
ℓ6 AC 650 450
ℓ7 AC 150 250
ℓ8 AC 600 1000
ℓ9 AC 2145 2095
ℓ10 DC 680 740
ℓ11 DC 590 600
ℓ12 AC 1700 1300
ℓ13 AC 1480 1120
ℓ14 DC 1200 1200
ℓ15 AC 1480 1120
ℓ16 DC 1200 1200
ℓ17 DC 860 1016
ℓ18 AC 750 779
ℓ19 AC 1234 684
2 correspond to DC links and solid lines to the AC grid [34];
these are assumed to have similar conductivity characteristics.
Maximum thermal line capacities (Table I) are based on the
most frequent Elspot day-ahead capacities in 2014 [32].
Average DH prices (excluding taxes) in 2014 were
e59/MWhth in Finland, e66/MWhth in Denmark,
e70/MWhth in Norway, and e71/MWhth in Sweden
[35]–[38]. To account for capacity centralization, we consider
TABLE II
MARGINAL COST ESTIMATES (U IN e/MWH, X IN e/MWHth , Y IN
e/MWH AND e/MWHth). (“-” NOT APPLICABLE, *CALIBRATED,
**HOUR-DEPENDENT)
Fuel Types Cpowern,u,t C
chp,p
yB
/Cchp,h
yB
C
chp,p
yE
/Cchp,h
yE
Cheatx
Coal u1, y1, x1 29 - 15 / 30 47
Natural gas u2, y2, x2 85 45 / 50 46 / 51 53
CCGT u3 47,* - - -
Oil u4, y4, x4 78 37 / 51 38 / 52 54
Biomass u5, y5, x5 62 - 28 / 26 27
Oil shale u6 33 - - -
Nuclear u7 9 - - -
Hydro u8 *,** - - -
Waste y9, x9 - - 25 / 3 24
Peat y10, x10 - - 22 / 25 25
Bio oil x11 - - - 51
DH transmission efficiencies (Sweden 88%, Finland 91%,
Denmark 80%, and Norway 89%) and set minimum shares
of fringes’ DH supplies to be covered by heat-only (Sweden
60%, Finland 30%, Denmark 27%, and Norway 99% as
annual DH production not covered by CHP) [35], [37]–[43].
Producers’ hourly DH sales are estimated based on their share
of the annual supply and an estimated DH demand based
on outside temperature (heating-degree hours) and hot-water
demand (30% of annual DH demand).
Production costs (Table II) are based on fuel costs (power
[44]–[46], heat [47], [48]) variable O&M costs [49], and CO2
emission costs (e5/t, [2]) along with emission rates [50]. The
CHP marginal cost is allocated to heat and power proportional
to the energy content of each product, which is known as the
energy method [51].
The producer set, I, includes the largest Nordic power-
only and CHP owners. The rest and the majority of DH
producers are aggregated into national fringe groups.2 Installed
power and CHP capacities (Tables III and IV, respectively)
are mainly from Platts [52] but updated from the companies’
websites. Finnish heat-only capacity is from [35] (Table V).
Where available, producer-level data for other countries are in-
dividually obtained from the companies’ websites (Vattenfall,
Statkraft). Others are estimated from companies’ annual DH
production mix, their relation to the Finnish DH production,
and Finland’s installed heat-only capacity. Power-to-heat ratios
(Rp-t-h
yB/E
) for CHP operations are from [49]. For simplicity, we
use Rf-t-h
yE
=0.25 and Rf-t-p
yE
=2.4 for all extraction unit types [10].
Maximum fuel intake (F yE ) is defined as the ratio between
total capacity and total efficiency of an extraction unit yE.
In 2014, there was roughly 50 GWhth of heat storage in
Denmark [53] and 17 GWhth in Finland [54]. SE and NO
capacities are estimated from Finnish data, resulting in ca. 25
GWhth and 4 GWhth, respectively. The ownership structure is
based on producers’ DH capacities. We use 99% for input and
hourly periodic storage efficiency. Charge and discharge rates,
and minimum and initial states of charge, are set to 30%.
Hydropower availability represents historical monthly av-
2Vattenfall (i1), E.ON (i2), Ringhals (i3), OKG (i4), Fortum (i5), Fringe
SE (i6), TVO (i7), PVO (i8), Helsingin Energia (i9), Kemijoki (i10), Fringe
FI (i11), Dong (i12), Fringe DK (i13), Statkraft (i14), Eco Vannkraft
(i15), Norsk Hydro (i16), Sira-Kvina (i17), Agder Energi (i18), BKK (i19),
Oppland Energi (i20), Fringe NO (i21), aggregated Baltic companies (i22).
7TABLE III
INSTALLED POWER-ONLY CAPACITY (GW) IN 2014 AND AVAILABILITY
PERCENTAGES. (*AGGREGATED, INCL. POSSIBLE CHP-POWER)
Node Producer u1 u2 u3 u4 u5 u6 u7 u8 Wind PV
SE i1 - - - - - - 3.2 8 0.4 -
i2 - 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 - - 2.6 0.2 -
i3 - - - - - - 3.7 - - -
i4 - - - - - - 2.6 - - -
i5 - - - - - - - 2.9 - -
i6 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.8 0.1 - - 3.9 4.8 0.1
FI i5 0.6 - - - - - 1.0 0.8 - -
i7 - - - - - - 1.8 - - -
i8 0.5 - - 0.2 - - - 0.4 - -
i9 - - - 0.1 - - - - - -
i10 - - - - - - - 1.1 - -
i11 - 0.1 - 1.1 - - - 0.8 0.6 -
DK1 i12 - - - - - - - - 0.4 -
i1 - - - - - - - - 0.4 -
i13 - - - - - - - - 3.0 0.4
DK2 i12 - - - 0.7 - - - - 0.2 -
i13 - - - - - - - - 0.8 0.2
NO i14 - - 0.2 - - - - 9.9 0.2 -
i15 - - - - - - - 2.5 - -
i16 - - - - - - - 2.0 - -
i17 - - - - - - - 1.8 - -
i18 - - - - - - - 1.7 - -
i19 - - - - - - - 1.4 - -
i20 - - - - - - - 1.2 - -
i21 - - 0.2 0.1 - - - 9.6 0.7 -
EE∗ i22 - 0.2 - - 0.1 1.8 - - 0.3 -
LV ∗ i22 - 0.5 - - - - - 1.5 0.1 -
LT∗ i22 - 1.6 0.5 0.8 - - - 1.0 0.3 -
% Available 90 95 80 86 95 90 90 Fig. 4c Fig. 4a Fig. 4b
TABLE IV
INSTALLED CHP-POWER CAPACITY (GW) IN 2014 AS BACK-PRESSURE
(yB ) AND EXTRACTION (yE ) UNITS AND RELATED PARAMETERS.
Node Producer y1E y9E y2B y2E y4B y4E y10E y5E
SE i1 - - - - - - - 0.2
i2 - - - - 0.1 - - 0.2
i5 0.1 0.1 - - - 0.2 - 0.2
i6 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 - 1.8
FI i5 0.1 - 0.3 - - - 0.1 -
i9 0.4 - 0.6 - - - - -
i11 0.9 - 0.7 0.2 - 0.1 1.1 0.5
DK1 i12 1.1 - 0.1 0.4 - - - 0.1
i1 0.7 - - - - - - -
i13 - 0.1 0.5 0.4 - - - -
DK2 i12 1.1 - - 0.3 - - - 0.5
i13 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.3 - 0.1 - 0.1
% Available 90 90 95 95 95 95 95 95
R
p-t-h
yB/E
0.58 0.28 0.78 1.18 0.78 1.18 0.43 0.43
TABLE V
INSTALLED HEAT-ONLY CAPACITY (GWth) IN 2014 AND AVAILABILITY
PERCENTAGES. (*ESTIMATES BASED ON FI )
Node Producer x1 x9 x2 x4 x10 x5 x11
SE∗ i1 - - - - - 0.5 -
i2 - 0.3 0.1 - - 0.2 -
i5 0.2 0.4 - - - 0.2 0.1
i6 0.6 6.4 0.6 0.6 0.8 12.2 0.6
FI i5 0.2 - 0.6 0.4 - - -
i9 0.2 - 1.0 1.2 - - -
i11 - - 2.3 5.3 0.9 1.3 -
DK1∗ i13 1.7 1.7 1.5 0.1 - 2.9 -
DK2∗ i13 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.1 - 1.9 -
NO∗ i14 - 0.3 - - - 0.1 -
i21 - 3.3 0.3 0.1 - 1.2 -
% Available 90 90 95 95 95 95 95
erage production of installed capacity for Finland [55] and
Sweden [56]. Norwegian hydropower production is estimated
as 96% of the NO price areas’ Nord Pool Elspot sales volumes
[32]. Likewise, the availability of wind (Fig. 4a) and solar PV
(Fig. 4b) represent average hourly production [32], [55]–[57].
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Fig. 5. Average system prices under perfect competition (PC), Cournot
oligopoly (CO), and historical 2014 prices in the (M) March scenario.
TABLE VI
TEST CASES.
Model Perfect Competition Cournot Oligopoly
CHP (status quo) SQ-PC SQ-CO
CHP decoupling DE-PC DE-CO
B. Calibration
To obtain credible results, the model is calibrated to produce
close-to 2014 Nord Pool prices (Fig. 5, mainly between
perfect competition and Cournot oligopoly) and a reasonable
production mix. This is done by adjusting hydro water values
and availability (Fig. 4c). In addition, the CCGT fuel price is
set to e47/MWh to calibrate prices in the Baltic nodes.
C. Test Cases
We define four test cases (Table VI) to study our research
questions. Thus, in addition to the market power consideration,
we test two possibilities for CHP: the current situation and
a hypothetical case in which the power and heat capacities
are decoupled into power-only and heat-only components. In
practice, this means the same nominal capacities implied by
(6) and (9) without the linking constraints (4)–(5), while using
the corresponding power-only and heat-only costs from Table
II (except for waste and peat, for which there is no power-only,
so we use power component costs equal to biomass).
Thus, combined with the seasonal scenarios (M), (J), (S),
and (D), we implement 4x4 runs in the General Algebraic
Modeling System (GAMS). We reformulate the MCPs as anal-
ogous convex quadratic programs (QPs) because the resulting
optimization problems can be solved more quickly and reliably
with CPLEX [58] than as MCPs with PATH, which uses a
generalization of Newton’s method to solve a square system of
equations [59].3 According to Theorem 4.4 in [20], the global
optimum for the corresponding QP is also an equilibrium
solution to the MCP.
Finally, as indicated in Section II-A1, we also check the
ex post power output for operational plants to verify that
most of them run at well above their minimum power output
levels. For example, in March under perfect competition, CHP
plants operate at more than 0% but less than 20% of the
rated power capacity only 4% of the time (14 plant-period
instances out of a possible 350 plant-period combinations).
The results are similar for other months, power-only plants,
3On a workstation with a 2.40 GHz Intel i5-6300 core processor and 8
GB of RAM, the QP reformulation decreases the computational time of each
problem instance from tens of minutes to a few seconds.
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Fig. 4. Average hourly VRE production and available hydropower of installed capacity in 2014 in (M) March, (J) June, (S) September, and (D) December.
Fig. 6. CHP decoupling impacts on system average electricity prices.
and Cournot oligopoly cases, i.e., the share of such minimum-
power violations is between 1% and 4%.
D. Results
1) Power Markets: The decoupling of CHP production
components increases electricity prices under perfect compe-
tition in all scenarios with a greater impact during peak hours
(Fig. 6). The price increase indicates that CHP reduces system
costs due to its higher joint production efficiency. Moreover,
as extraction units comprise 83% of the CHP capacity in the
Nordic energy system, there is also not much loss in flexibility
due to cogeneration. Decoupling, thus, reduces cost effective-
ness without offering any meaningful countervailing increase
in flexibility. Decoupling impacts under Cournot oligopoly are
similar to those under perfect competition, except for being
smaller in magnitude perhaps because power output is already
withheld due to market power. There is also more parity
between off-peak and peak hours (Fig. 6).
Analysis of the impact of market power (Table VII) indi-
cates that it decreases social welfare to the detriment of con-
sumers but to the benefit of producers. Moreover, CHP enables
this effect to be stronger. The effect of market power on prices
(Fig. 7) is most severe during off-peak hours since there is
more scope to increase prices. During peak hours, the impact
of market power on prices is typically stronger with CHP
(Cases SQ-PC and SQ-CO). To see this, note that more power
is withheld during peak hours with CHP (Fig. 8) than without
CHP (Fig. 9). Thus, on average, market power increases prices
less when heat and power production are decoupled. In order to
understand why less withholding may occur under decoupling,
consider the profit-maximization problem of a monopolist with
power-only generation: maxq P (q)q−C(q), which leads to the
TABLE VII
MARKET POWER IMPACT (∆) ON SOCIAL WELFARE (SW), CONSUMER
SURPLUS (CS), PRODUCER SURPLUS (PS), AND GRID OWNER’S SURPLUS
(GR). VALUES IN THOUSANDS OF e, AVERAGE OF SEASONS (M)-(D).
SQ-PC SQ-CO ∆ DE-PC DE-CO ∆
SW 87 113 86 777 - 336 84 549 84 237 - 312
CS 57 697 51 439 - 6 258 53 393 48 607 - 4 785
PS 28 578 34 686 6 107 30 136 34 805 4 670
GR 838 652 - 185 1 020 825 -196
Fig. 7. Market power impacts on system average electricity prices.
first-order necessary condition P ′(q)q+P (q)−C ′(q) = 0. Be-
cause the three terms correspond to the marginal profit from an
infinitesimal increase in production, we can unpick the effects
of an infinitesimal reduction in sales: an increase in revenue
due to a higher selling price, a decrease in revenue from lower
sales, and a decrease in cost from less production. The first
and third terms are marginal revenues from withholding, and
the second term is the marginal cost of withholding. With
CHP, the second term is reduced because the producer can
offset the lost electricity market revenue with heat production.
Hence, the availability of CHP reduces the marginal cost of
withholding so that more power production is withheld.
2) DH Sector: CHP links the producers’ ability to impact
prices through power production decisions to the DH sec-
tor. Examining DH production, we find that market power
increases (decreases) CHP (heat-only) output during season
(D) (Fig. 10). The impact in other seasons is negligible
and is significantly larger in (D) perhaps due to higher DH
supply, i.e., more to withhold from. As indicated by Figs.
8 and 9 along with the preceding discussion, CHP makes
it easier to withhold generation so that producers switch to
CHP heat output from heat-only plants to meet their DH
obligations. Indeed, somewhat paradoxically, by shutting down
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Fig. 8. Market power impacts on electricity output in (D) December (Case
SQ-CO vs. SQ-PC).
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Fig. 10. Market power impacts on DH production (GWhth) from CHP and
heat-only, and on CO2 emissions from the heating sector (Gg) (Case SQ-CO
vs. SQ-PC).
heat-only plants rather than CHP units, producers behaving
a` la Cournot exert more leverage to increase power prices.
Most of the power withholding comes from power-only, but a
similar logic may apply for CHP during peak hours (Fig. 8).
Finally, we find that market power slightly shifts production
toward CHP biomass and peat in FI from heat-only biomass as
producers seek to exert their market power, which increases
CO2 emissions as biomass is deemed carbon neutral in the
EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS).
IV. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Transitions in energy markets affect the role of CHP in
DH-intensive systems and call for suitable models for un-
derstanding what market outcomes there are when producers
may behave strategically. In this paper, we investigate (i)
whether CHP mitigates market power and (ii) how market
power affects the DH sector’s operations. To this end, we
use complementarity modeling to compare perfect competition
with a Cournot oligopoly for the Nordic region.
We find that (i) CHP can intensify producers’ market power
by reducing the opportunity cost of withholding output. We
also observe that (ii) market power may shift DH production
to CHP from heat-only because of the additional leverage it
provides during peak hours. Finally, even with fixed DH sales,
market power may impact CO2 emissions from the DH sector
due to production mix changes.
Our study provides insights into heat and power production
interactions in the Nordic system, which has a significant
DH sector. Such impacts should be taken into account when
assessing the role of CHP in similar energy systems, even if
our approach has been limited in considering more complex
CHP operations and the topology of district heating. It may
be that market power use is possible or attractive only for
a small number of (CHP) producers. Finally, including VRE
uncertainty and capacity expansion are fruitful topics for
extending this research.
APPENDIX
From (1)–(12), the Cournot producers’ KKT conditions are:
0 ≤
(
C
power
n,u,t − ωn,t
)
−δ
power
i,t + λ
power
n,i,u,t + ρ
power-up
n,i,u,t − ρ
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n,i,u,t ≥ 0, ∀n, i, u ∈ Un,i, t (F1)
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n,i,x,t+1 − ρ
heat-down
n,i,x,t
⊥ gheatn,i,x,t ≥ 0, ∀n, i, x ∈ Xn,i, t (F4)
0 ≤ −ωn,t − δ
power
i,t + λ
e
n,i,t ⊥ g
e
n,i,t ≥ 0, ∀n, i, e, t (F5)
0 ≤ −
(
Dintn,t −D
slp
n,t(
∑
i′∈I
q
power
n,i′,t
+ q
power
n,i,t)− ωn,t
)
+ δ
power
i,t
⊥ q
power
n,i,t ≥ 0, ∀n, i, t (F6)
0 ≤ βbaln,i,t − (1− E
dec)Ttβbaln,i,t+1 + β
ub
n,i,t − β
lb
n,i,t
⊥ rston,i,t ≥ 0, ∀n, i, t (F7)
0 ≤ δheatn,i,t − E
effβbaln,i,t + β
in
n,i,t ⊥ r
in
n,i,t ≥ 0, ∀n, i, t (F8)
0 ≤ −δheatn,i,t + β
bal
n,i,t + β
out
n,i,t ⊥ r
out
n,i,t ≥ 0, ∀n, i, t (F9)
0 =
∑
n∈N
q
power
n,i,t −
∑
n∈N
∑
u∈Un,i
g
power
n,i,u,t −
∑
n∈N
∑
y∈Yn,i
g
chp,p
n,i,y,t
−
∑
n∈N
∑
e∈E
gen,i,t with δ
power
i,t u.r.s., ∀i, t (F10)
0 = Qheatn,i,t −
∑
x∈Xn,i
Etransn g
heat
n,i,x,t −
∑
y∈Yn,i
Etransn g
chp,h
n,i,y,t
+rinn,i,t − r
out
n,i,t with δ
heat
n,i,t u.r.s., ∀n, i, t (F11)
0 = g
chp,p
n,i,yB,t
−R
p-t-h
yB
g
chp,h
n,i,yB,t
with φB
n,i,yB,t u.r.s., ∀n, i, y
B ∈ YBn,i, t (F12)
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0 ≤ g
chp,p
n,i,yE,t
−R
p-t-h
yE
g
chp,h
n,i,yE,t
⊥ φ
E,p-t-h
n,i,yE,t
≥ 0, ∀n, i, yE ∈ YEn,i, t (F13)
0 ≤ F yE −R
f-t-h
yE g
chp,h
n,i,yE,t
−R
f-t-p
yE
g
chp,p
n,i,yE,t
⊥ φE,ub-fuel
n,i,yE,t
≥ 0, ∀n, i, yE ∈ YEn,i, t (F14)
0 ≤
∑
x∈Xn,i
Etransn g
heat
n,i,x,t −R
heat-only
n,i Q
heat
n,i,t
⊥ δ
heat-only
n,i,t ≥ 0, ∀n, i, t (F15)
0 ≤ TtG
power
n,i,u − g
power
n,i,u,t ⊥ λ
power
n,i,u,t ≥ 0, ∀n, i, u ∈ Un,i, t (F16)
0 ≤ TtG
chp,h
n,i,y − g
chp,h
n,i,y,t ⊥ λ
chp,h
n,i,y,t ≥ 0, ∀n, i, y ∈ Yn,i, t (F17)
0 ≤ TtG
heat
n,i,x − g
heat
n,i,x,t ⊥ λ
heat
n,i,x,t ≥ 0, ∀n, i, x ∈ Xn,i, t (F18)
0 = gen,i,t − TtA
e
n,tG
e
n,i with λen,i,t u.r.s., ∀n, i, e, t (F19)
0 ≤ −g
power
n,i,u,t + g
power
n,i,u,t−1 + TtR
power-up
u G
power
n,i,u
⊥ ρ
power-up
n,i,u,t , ∀n, i, u ∈ Un,i, t (F20)
0 ≤ −g
power
n,i,u,t−1 + g
power
n,i,u,t + TtR
power-down
u G
power
n,i,u
⊥ ρ
power-down
n,i,u,t , ∀n, i, u ∈ Un,i, t (F21)
0≤ −g
chp,h
n,i,y,t + g
chp,h
n,i,y,t−1 + TtR
chp-up
y G
chp,h
n,i,y
⊥ ρ
chp-up
n,i,y,t, ∀n, i, y ∈ Yn,i, t (F22)
0≤ −g
chp,h
n,i,y,t−1 + g
chp,h
n,i,y,t + TtR
chp-down
y G
chp,h
n,i,y
⊥ ρ
chp-down
n,i,y,t , ∀n, i, y ∈ Yn,i, t (F23)
0 ≤ −gheatn,i,x,t + g
heat
n,i,x,t−1 + TtR
heat-up
x G
heat
n,i,x
⊥ ρ
heat-up
n,i,x,t, ∀n, i, x ∈ Xn,i, t (F24)
0 ≤ −gheatn,i,x,t−1 + g
heat
n,i,x,t + TtR
heat-down
x G
heat
n,i,x
⊥ ρheat-downn,i,x,t , ∀n, i, x ∈ Xn,i, t (F25)
0 = rston,i,t − (1− E
dec)Ttrston,i,t−1 − E
effrinn,i,t + r
out
n,i,t
with βbaln,i,t u.r.s., ∀n, i, t (F26)
0 ≤ TtE
inE
max
n,i − r
in
n,i,t ⊥ β
in
n,i,t ≥ 0, ∀n, i, t (F27)
0 ≤ TtE
outE
max
n,i − r
out
n,i,t ⊥ β
out
n,i,t ≥ 0, ∀n, i, t (F28)
0 ≤ E
max
n,i − r
sto
n,i,t ⊥ β
ub
n,i,t ≥ 0, ∀n, i, t (F29)
0 ≤ −Eminn,i + r
sto
n,i,t ⊥ β
lb
n,i,t ≥ 0, ∀n, i, t (F30)
From (23)–(28), the grid owner’s KKT conditions are:
0 =
∑
ℓAC∈LAC
TtHℓAC,nACηℓAC,t + TtSnACγnAC,t
with θnAC,t u.r.s., ∀n
AC ∈ NAC, t (G1)
0 = −
∑
n′∈N
TtMℓ,n′ωn′,t − TtηℓAC,t + Ttµℓ,t − Ttµℓ,t
with fℓ,t u.r.s., ∀ℓ, t (G2)
0 =
∑
n∈N
TtHℓAC,nACθnAC,t − TtfℓAC,t
with ηℓAC,t u.r.s., ∀ℓ
AC ∈ LAC, t (G3)
0 ≤ TtKℓ − Ttfℓ,t ⊥ µℓ,t ≥ 0, ∀ℓ, t (G4)
0 ≤ TtKℓ + Ttfℓ,t ⊥ µℓ,t ≥ 0, ∀ℓ, t (G5)
0 = TtSnACθnAC,t with γnAC,t u.r.s., ∀n
AC ∈ NAC, t (G6)
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